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IS POST-KELO EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM BAD
FOR THE POOR?
Ilya Somin*

INTRODUCTION
In a recent article in the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy,1 Professor David Dana argues that most post-Kelo reform efforts are
seriously flawed because they tend to forbid the condemnation of the property of the wealthy and the middle class for ―economic development,‖ but
allow the condemnation of land on which poor people live under the guise
of alleviating ―blight.‖ This, he claims, results in reform laws that ―privilege[] the stability of middle-class households relative to the stability of
poor households‖ and ―express[] the view that the interests and needs of
poor households are relatively unimportant.‖2
I agree with Professor Dana that the problem of blight condemnations
and its impact on the poor deserves much greater attention, and that postKelo reform initiatives should do more to address these concerns. However, I disagree with his argument that post-Kelo reform efforts have systematically treated land where the poor tend to live worse than that of middle
and upper class homeowners. As of this time (March 2007), most of the
states that have enacted post-Kelo reform laws have either banned both
blight and economic development takings (five states, plus Utah, which
enacted its reform law prior to Kelo), or defined ―blight‖ so broadly that
virtually any property can be declared ―blighted‖ and taken (sixteen states).
Several other states have enacted reforms that provide no real protection to
any property owners because of other types of shortcomings. Only nine
states are actually guilty of the sin condemned by Professor Dana of allowing only the condemnation of ―blighted‖ areas narrowly defined.
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1
David Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after Kelo, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 365 (2007), 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 5 (2006), http://www.law.northwestern.edu
/lawreview/colloquy/2006/2/ (link) (citations infra refer to the Colloquy).
2
Id. at 5.
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To the extent that some states have indeed banned ―economic development‖ condemnations in affluent neighborhoods, while permitting
―blight‖ condemnations to go on in poor ones, I agree that this is a lamentable state of affairs. However, it may still be a better result than simply subjecting all property to the risk of economic development takings. A law
that protects the property rights of most but not all of the population is preferable to one that protects no one. Such a law might also benefit many
poor people who live in nonblighted areas and are potentially vulnerable to
economic development takings. Survey data suggests that the poor themselves overwhelmingly oppose economic development condemnations.
Furthermore, the exclusion of blighted property from some states‘ bans
on ―economic development‖ condemnations in some states is not necessarily explained by indifference to or contempt for the interests of the poor.
There are perfectly noninvidious (though in my view flawed) reasons for
believing that condemnation is sometimes necessary to eliminate blight.
There are few or no reasons, however, to use condemnation to promote
economic development through the transfer of property to private owners.
I. POST-KELO REFORM AND THE POOR.
Since Kelo v. City of New London3 was decided in June 2005, twentyeight states have enacted eminent domain reforms through the regular legislative process and ten (including several that also enacted legislative reforms) by referendum. Altogether, thirty-five states have enacted reforms
that purport to ban or restrict ―economic development‖ takings. The state
of Utah banned both economic development takings and blight condemnations in early 2005, before Kelo was decided.4 Seventeen of the twentyeight reforms enacted by state legislatures are largely ineffective, providing
little or no real protection to property owners against economic development takings.5 This is also true of several of the reforms enacted by referendum. With respect to these states, Professor Dana‘s claim that middle
class households are getting better protection than the poor is incorrect because, quite simply, neither group is getting any real protection at all.
In at least sixteen states, post-Kelo reforms have been ineffective because they contain ―blight‖ exceptions so broad that virtually any property
can be defined as ―blighted‖—including property in middle class or even
3

545 U.S. 469 (2005) (link).
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C-1-202 (amended May 1, 2006) (link) (outlining powers of redevelopment agencies and omitting the power to use eminent domain for blight alleviation or development);
see also Henry Lamb, Utah Bans Eminent Domain Use by Redevelopment Agencies, ENV. NEWS, June
1, 2005, available at http://www.heartland.org/article.cfm?artID=17162 (link) (describing the politics
behind the Utah law).
5
I discuss this in much greater detail in a recent paper. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash:
Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 07-14,
Mar. 27, 2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976298 (link).
4
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wealthy neighborhoods.6 For example, nine state post-Kelo laws incorporate definitions of ―blight‖ that include any area where there are obstacles to
―sound growth‖ or conditions that constitute an ―economic or social liability.‖ These include reform laws in Alaska,7 Colorado,8 Missouri,9 Nebraska,10 North Carolina,11 Ohio,12 Texas,13 Vermont,14 and West Virginia.15
6
For a more detailed analysis of these reform laws and the reasons why they are unlikely to have
any meaningful effect, see id. at 15–21.
7
See H.B. 318, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2006) (enacted July 5, 2006) (link) (exempting preexisting public uses declared in state law from a ban on economic development takings); ALASKA STAT. §
18.55.950 (2006) (link) (―‗[B]lighted area‘ means an area, other than a slum area, that by reason of the
predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or improvements, tax or
special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land, improper subdivision or obsolete
platting, or the existence of conditions that endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any
combination of these factors, substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a
menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its condition and use.‖). Professor Dana interprets this statute as failing to address blight condemnations ―at all.‖ Dana, supra note 1, at 15. However, the text of the law does in fact exempt blight condemnations from its scope by exempting all
preexisting public uses declared in state law, of which blight is one.
8
See H.B. 1411, 65th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (enacted June 6, 2006) (link) (allowing
condemnation for ―eradication of blight‖); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-103(2) (2006) (link) (defining
―blight‖ to include any condition that ―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability,
and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare‖).
9
See S.B. 1944, § 523.271.2, 93rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (enacted July 13, 2006)
(link) (exempting blight condemnations from ban on ―economic development‖ takings); MO. REV.
STAT. § 100.310(2) (2006) (link) (defining ―blight‖ as ―an area which, by reason of the predominance
of defective or inadequate street layout, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or
property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors, retards the provision of housing
accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare in its present condition and use‖).
10
See L.B. 924, 99th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2006) (enacted April 13, 2006) (exempting ―blight‖
condemnations from ban on economic development takings); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2103 (2006) (link)
(defining blight to include any area in a condition that ―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth
of the community, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability‖ and has ―deteriorating‖ structures).
11
See H.B. 1965, § 2.1, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006) (enacted Aug. 10, 2006) (link)
(Exempting blight condemnations from restrictions on economic development takings and stating that
―‗[b]lighted area‘ shall mean an area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improvements (or
which is predominantly residential in character), and which, by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age
or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open spaces, high density
of population and overcrowding, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, or the existence of conditions which
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors, substantially impairs the sound growth of the community, is conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency and crime, and is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or
welfare.‖).
12
See S.B. 167, § 1, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (link) (exempting ―blight‖ condemnations from temporary moratorium on economic development takings); OH. REV. CODE ANN. §
303.26(E) (West 2006) (link) (defining blight to include ―deterioration‖ of structures or where the site
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Any obstacle to economic development can easily be defined as impairing
―sound growth,‖ making this definition of blight broad enough to justify
virtually any condemnation that could be justified under an economic development rationale. Similarly, any impediment to ―economic development‖ can be considered an ―economic or social liability.‖ Seven other
states, including Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Tennessee, Wisconsin,16
and the crucial state of California,17 have differently worded but comparably
broad blight exemptions. Several more states have enacted post-Kelo laws
that fail to protect property owners for other reasons.18
State courts have, for decades, interpreted similar definitions of blight
to allow the condemnation of nearly any property a local government seeks
to acquire. For example, recent state appellate court decisions have held
that Times Square in New York City19 and downtown Las Vegas20 are
―blighted,‖ thereby justifying condemnations undertaken to acquire land for
a new headquarters for the New York Times and parking lots for a consortium of local casinos respectively. If these areas could be considered
blighted, so too could virtually any others. Sixteen states, however, have
enacted post-Kelo reform laws that do provide substantial protection for
property owners relative to that which existed previously—nine by legislation, four by referendum initiative, and three by both of these means.21
Many of these jurisdictions, however, have banned blight condemnations as
―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a county, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare‖).
13
See S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005) (enacted Sept. 1, 2005) (link) (exempting ―blight‖
condemnations from ban on economic development takings); TEX. LOCAL GOV‘T CODE Ann. § 374
(Vernon 2006) (link) (defining a ―blighted area‖ as one that ―because of deteriorating buildings, structures, or other improvements; defective or inadequate streets, street layout, or accessibility; unsanitary
conditions; or other hazardous conditions, adversely affects the public health, safety, morals, or welfare .
. . or results in an economic or social liability to the municipality‖).
14
See S.B. 246, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2006) (link) (exempting blight condemnations from
ban on economic development takings, and defining blight to include any planning or layout condition
that ―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a municipality, retards the provision of housing
accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare‖).
15
See H.B. 4048, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 2006) (enacted April 2006) (link) (exempting blight
condemnation from ban and defining blight to include an area that, for any number of factors such as
deterioration or inadequate street layout, ―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability
and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare‖).
16
For a discussion of blight exemptions in these states, see Somin, supra note 5, at 18–22.
17
Id. at 21–22.
18
Id. at 26–28.
19
See In re W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002).
20
See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12–15 (Nev. 2003).
21
See Somin, supra note 5, at 10–14.
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/15/

198

101:195 (2007)

Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad

well as ―economic development‖ takings, thereby going against Professor
Dana‘s argument that Post-Kelo reform has ignored the needs of poor
people who live in blighted areas.
The state of Florida has banned blight condemnations and economic
development takings in its unusually strong post-Kelo reform law,22 despite
its extensive past use of blight condemnations. Referendum initiatives in
Nevada and North Dakota similarly ban blight condemnation completely.23
South Dakota‘s post-Kelo reform law continues to permit blight condemnations, but greatly reduces the political incentive to engage in them by forbidding the transfer of condemned property to private parties.24 This rule
prevents the use of blight condemnations to transfer property to politically
influential interest groups, eliminating one of the main political incentives
for undertaking them in the first place. Kansas‘ new law, meanwhile, limits
blight condemnations to cases where the property in question is ―unsafe for
occupation by humans under the building codes.‖25 And as we have seen,
the Utah reform law enacted a few months before Kelo also banned blight
condemnations.
In sum, of the seventeen states (counting Utah) that have recently
enacted eminent domain reform laws with real teeth of any kind, six have
either abolished blight condemnations or come close to doing so. Of the
remaining eleven states, most do indeed protect middle and upper class
neighborhoods by defining blight narrowly.26 However, two of these
states—Minnesota and Pennsylvania—also provide only very limited protection even to middle class neighborhoods because their bans on economic
development takings exempt the major urban areas (Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and the Twin Cities) where most of those states‘ condemnations take
place.27
Overall, only nine of the thirty-six states that have enacted reform legislation in the wake of Kelo or, in the case of Utah, immediately before it,
seem to even roughly fit the predictions of Professor Dana‘s thesis that
post-Kelo reform protects the middle class and the wealthy without protect22

See H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (enacted May 11, 2006) (link).
See Nev. Ballot Question 2 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006 as NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22 §§ 1) (link) (forbidding the ―direct or indirect transfer of any interest in property taken in an eminent domain proceeding
from one private party to another private party‖); N.D. Measure 2 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006 as N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 16) (link) (―[P]ublic use or a public purpose does not include public benefits of economic development, including an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health. Private property shall not be taken for the use of, or ownership by, any private individual or entity, unless
that property is necessary for conducting a common carrier or utility business.‖) .
24
H.B. 1080, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2006) (signed into law Feb. 27, 2006) (link). Professor
Dana claims that South Dakota‘s law doesn‘t address blight condemnations ―at all.‖ Dana, supra note 1,
at 16. However, private-to-private blight condemnations are surely covered by the law‘s general ban on
private to private takings of any kind.
25
S.B. 323, §§ 1–2, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006) (signed into law May 18, 2006) (link).
26
See Somin, supra note 5, at 28–33 (discussing these laws in detail).
27
Id. at 27–30.
23

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/15/

199

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

ing the poor. The states in this category include Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Oregon, and New Hampshire.28
The remaining new laws either protect both groups more or less equally or
provide no meaningful protection to anyone.
This pattern—combined with the broad ―blight‖ exceptions in many of
the post-Kelo laws—partially undermines Professor Dana‘s claims that
post-Kelo reform protects the wealthy and the middle at the expense of the
poor. On the other hand, it is important to recognize—as I and other scholars have contended in earlier work—that both blight and economic development condemnations do, in practice, victimize the poor
disproportionately.29 This is a serious problem, and one that requires greater scholarly, judicial and legislative attention. However, post-Kelo reform
has not noticeably exacerbated the problem, and in those states that have
abolished or substantially curbed blight condemnations, reform may well
help to alleviate it.
II. ARE REFORM LAWS THAT STILL PERMIT BLIGHT CONDEMNATIONS
BAD FOR THE POOR?
Given that nine states have indeed enacted post-Kelo reform laws that
fit the pattern outlined by Professor Dana, it is still important to ask whether
such laws do in fact harm the poor for the benefit of the relatively affluent,
as he contends. Moreover, eleven state supreme courts have banned economic development takings under their state constitutions (including two
since Kelo), and none of them have so far also banned blight condemnations.30 While I agree with Professor Dana‘s view that the impact of emi28

Id. at 26–29
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo, 15 SUP CT ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=874865 (link);
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent
Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 1 (2003) (link).
30
The eleven states are Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington. See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494–
95 (Ark. 1967) (private economic development project not a public use); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown
Dev. Auth., 315 So.2d 451, 457 (Fla. 1975) (holding that a ―‗public [economic] benefit‘ is not synonymous with ‗public purpose‘ as a predicate which can justify eminent domain . . . .‖); Sw. Ill. Dev.
Auth. v. Nat‘l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9–11 (Ill. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002)
(link) (holding that a ―contribu[tion] to positive economic growth in the region‖ is not a public use justifying condemnation); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Ky. 1979) (―No ‗public use‘
is involved where the land of A is condemned merely to enable B to build a factory . . . .‖) (citation
omitted); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 906 (Me. 1957) (holding that private ―industrial development‖ to enhance economy not a public use); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004) (link) (overruling Poletown and holding that economic development takings are unconstitutional);
City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1995) (link) (holding that a condemnation
that transfers property to a ―private business‖ is unconstitutional unless the transfer to the business is
―insignificant‖ and ―incidental‖ to a public project); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115,
1141–42 (Ohio 2006) (link) (following Hathcock in holding that ―economic benefit‖ alone does not justify condemnation); Bd. of County Comm‘rs of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 642 (Okla.
29
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nent domain on the poor deserves greater consideration than it has so far received, I am not persuaded that post-Kelo reforms banning economic deopment takings while narrowing the definition of blight are worse than the
pre-Kelo status quo. Such laws can provide valuable, even if still inquate, protection to the poor. And, even if these reforms fail to help the
poor, they are unlikely to inflict additional harm on them.
It is important to recognize that even condemnations in ―nonblighted‖
areas are likely to disproportionately victimize the relatively poor. For example, the notorious 1981 Poletown takings in Detroit displaced some
4,000 mostly working class residents of a Detroit neighborhood so that
General Motors could build a new factory to promote ―economic development.‖31 Reform statutes that ban economic development takings while simultaneously narrowing the definition of blight could well prevent future
Poletowns. This is an achievement, even if it still fails to protect poor
people living in truly ―blighted‖ areas.
Perhaps, however, such tangible benefits for the poor might be outweighed by the ―expressive‖ harms emphasized by Professor Dana.32 It is
theoretically possible that the poor feel so stigmatized by the supposed
―message‖ that their households are ―fundamentally unequal in importance‖
relative to middle class homes, that they might be willing to forego the
tangible legal protection provided by post-Kelo reforms that ban economic
development takings but do not completely abolish blight condemnations.33
We cannot know for sure whether the poor feel this way. However,
survey evidence suggests that most do not. Professor Dana notes that ―poor
2006) (link) (holding that ―economic development‖ is not a ―public purpose‖ under the Oklahoma Constitution); Ga. Dep‘t of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (link) (holding that
even a substantial ―projected economic benefit‖ cannot justify condemnation); Karesh v. City of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (striking down taking justified only by economic development
because such condemnations do not ensure ―that the public has an enforceable right to a definite and
fixed use of the property‖ (quoting 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 31)); In re City of Seattle, 638 P.2d
549, 556–57 (Wash. 1981) (disallowing plan to use eminent domain to build retail shopping as not for a
public use); Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (Wash. 1959) (denying condemnation of residential property where government sought to ―devote it to what it considers a higher and better economic use‖). In some of these states, the wording of the state constitution restricts private-to-private
condemnations much more explicitly than does the Federal Takings Clause. See, e.g., Muskogee, 136
P.3d at 651–52 (discussing differences between the wording of the Oklahoma Constitution and that of
the Fifth Amendment and using the distinction as justification for interpreting the state takings clause in
a way contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Federal Takings Clause in Kelo). The
Norwood case did, however, suggest that some blight condemnations would violate the state constitution. See Ilya Somin, Blight Sweet Blight, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at 42 (discussing this aspect of
Norwood).
31
See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1011–16 (link). The Poletown
condemnations were upheld in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 1981), overruled by Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 765 (link).
32
Dana, supra note 1, at 20–21.
33
Id. at 21.
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/15/
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people subject to blight condemnation differ from the middle-class people
subject to economic development condemnation in two important respects:
they are more often renters than home owners, and they have less income
and wealth.‖34 Strikingly, however, neither of these important dividing
lines is a strong predictor of public opinion on economic development takings. Rich and poor and renters and homeowners all oppose them by lopsided margins. Table 2 shows that all of these groups also support laws
banning condemnations for private development.
While survey evidence may not be a good indication of the physical
and economic effects of condemnation on the poor, they provide an important window on the ―expressive‖ and dignitary harms emphasized by Professor Dana. If the poor themselves oppose Kelo and support laws banning
economic development takings, that suggests that any such harms are either
nonexistent or so minor as to be imperceptible to their supposed victims.
As Table 1 demonstrates, the November 2005 Saint Index survey of
public opinion on Kelo shows that strong opposition to the decision cuts
across class lines.35 Seventy percent of respondents from households earning under $10,000 per year expressed opposition, and 80% from those earning $10,000 to $24,999. This is only slighly lower than the 89% opposition
expressed by middle income households earning $35,000–$49,999 (the
highest rate for any income group), and actually higher than that expressed
by the very wealthiest category (those earning over $150,000), of whom
―only‖ 68% opposed Kelo.36
The Saint Index survey question asked respondents whether they supported the Supreme Court ruling holding that ―local governments can take
homes, business and private property to make way for private economic development if officials believe it would benefit the public.‖37 Significantly, it
refers only to ―economic development‖ condemnations and does not mention blight.
The Saint Index survey also shows that renters oppose Kelo almost as
strongly as homeowners, thus casting doubt on Professor Dana‘s suggestion
that post-Kelo reform inflicts dignitary harms on the former for the benefit
of the latter.38 The Kelo decision was opposed by 83% of homeowners and
70% of renters, including 54% of the latter who opposed the decision
34

Id. at 20.
Center for Economic and Civic Opinion at University of Massachusetts/Lowell, The Saint Index
Poll, Oct.–Nov. 2005 [hereinafter Saint Index] (unpublished survey, on file with author). Question
wording: ―The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that local governments can take homes, business and
private property to make way for private economic development if officials believe it would benefit the
public. How do you feel about this ruling?‖
36
One might expect this group to be the least opposed to economic development takings because it
is highly unusual for property belonging to the wealthy to be condemned for transfer to other private
parties.
37
Saint Index, supra note 35.
38
Dana, supra note 1, at 20–21.
35
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―strongly.‖39 While the percentage of renters opposing economic development takings was smaller than that of homeowners, it was still a lopsided
70% to 28% margin.40
Table 1: Public Opinion on Kelo by Household Income41

HOUSEHOLD
INCOME

VIEWS ON KELO
% Agree with
Decision

% Disagree
(―Strongly Disagree‖)

Under $10,000

25

70 (58)

$10,000–$24,999

20

80 (61)

$25,000–$34,999

18

80 (62)

$35,000–$49,999

11

89 (68)

$50,000–$74,999

15

85 (67)

$75,000–$150,000

25

73 (57)

Over $150,000

32

68 (48)

Total

18

81 (63)

Table 2 provides direct evidence of popular support for state reform
laws that ban condemnation of property for transfer to private developers—
the sorts of takings at issue in Kelo.42 Here too, survey respondents in all
income categories supported post-Kelo reform by lopsided—and roughly
equal—margins. Although the very poorest respondents supported reform
laws by the smallest margin of any income group—62% to 28%—
supporters still outnumbered opponents by more than two to one in that income class. And the highest rate of support from any income group was
39

Saint Index, supra note 35.
Id.
41
Saint Index, supra note 35. Question wording: ―The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that local
governments can take homes, business and private property to make way for private economic development if officials believe it would benefit the public. How do you feel about this ruling?‖
42
The wording of this survey is a bit unfortunate because it speaks of banning condemnations for
―private development,‖ whereas the standard rationale for Kelo-style condemnations is that they benefit
the general public, not just ―private‖ interests. However, such differences in wording seem to have only
a minor impact on survey respondents‘ expressed attitudes to economic development takings. For more
detailed discussion, see Somin, supra note 5, at 6–7 & n.34.
40

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/15/

203

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

that recorded in the second-lowest category, households earning between
$10,000 and $24,999 per year. This group of relatively poor respondents
supported the enactment of laws banning condemnation of property for
―private development‖ by an overwhelming 76%–19% margin. The 2006
Saint Index survey does provide modest support for Professor Dana‘s claim
that renters‘ interests differ from those of homeowners. Only 48% of renters supported reform laws in the survey, compared to 31% who were opposed.43 By contrast, 78% of homeowners supported banning takings for
―private development,‖ with only 21% opposed.44 Even among renters,
however, supporters of banning takings for private development outnumbered opponents by roughly a three to two margin.
Table 2: Public Opinion on Post-Kelo Reform by Household Income45
VIEW ON POST-KELO REFORM
HOUSEHOLD
INCOME

% SUPPORT
(―STRONGLY
SUPPORT‖)

% OPPOSE
(―STRONGLY
OPPOSE‖)

Under $10,000

62 (36)

28 (13)

$10,000–$24,999

76 (48)

19 (8)

$25,000–$34,999

65 (40)

29 (15)

$35,000–$49,999

75 (44)

21 (8)

$50,000–$74,999

69 (39)

23 (10)

$75,000–$150,000

73 (49)

23 (9)

Over $150,00046

N/A

N/A

Total

71 (43)

23 (10)

I am also skeptical of Professor Dana‘s assumption that most of the
non-poor voters who support post-Kelo reforms banning economic devel43
Center for Economic and Civic Opinion at University of Massachusetts/Lowell, The Saint Index
Poll, Sept.–Oct. 2006 (unpublished survey, on file with author).
44
Id.
45
Id. Question wording: ―Some states are considering enacting laws that will stop state and local
governments from taking private property for private development projects. Would you . . . [Strongly
Support, Support, Oppose, Strongly Oppose, or don‘t know] such laws?‖
46
Only two respondents were recorded in this category.
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opment takings, but not blight takings, do so because they believe that
―staying in your home only really matters if you are a middle-class person
in a middle-class home.‖47 It is possible that some voters hold this view.
However, many others might believe that blight condemnations actually
help the poor by ―cleaning up‖ their neighborhoods. This was part of the
historic rationale for blight condemnations, as Professor Dana admits.48
He emphasizes—and I emphatically agree—that real-world blight
condemnations frequently harm the poor, often benefiting wealthy or middle class interests at their expense.49 However, given widespread public ignorance about takings policy—ignorance so great that most people did not
realize that Kelo made little change to existing legal doctrine and that economic development takings were widespread before that decision50—it is
quite possible that most middle class and affluent voters were simply unaware of this record. In the same way, they seem to have been unaware of
the fact that most states—especially prior to the post-Kelo reforms—
defined blight so broadly that even middle class homes could easily be condemned on that basis.51 Indeed, it may be that large numbers of voters who
support various types of post-Kelo reform are completely unaware of the
existence of blight condemnations, just as the majority of citizens are sometimes unaware of the existence of other important government policies.52
Had they been aware of the true effects of many blight condemnations,
it is far from clear that most voters would have approved of them. A poll of
800 New Jersey residents taken in the fall of 2006 found that eighty-six
percent disapproved of ―[t]ak[ing] low value homes from people in order to
build higher value homes,‖ while only seven percent supported such condemnations.53 Many blight condemnations, of course do exactly that.54 Unless New Jersey opinion is highly unrepresentative of the rest of the
country, it seems likely that ignorance, not contempt for the poor, accounts
for the public‘s indifference to blight condemnations.

47

Dana, supra note 1, at 20.
Id. at 10; see also Pritchett, supra note 29, at 14–43 (describing the history of this rationale).
49
Dana, supra note 1, at 21–22.
50
See Somin, supra note 5, at 37–43 (discussing political ignorance about eminent domain policy
and its role in the Kelo backlash in great detail).
51
Id. at 38–39.
52
For example, a 2003 survey showed that 70 percent of respondents were unaware of the passage
of President Bush‘s massive prescription drug bill, the largest new government program in almost forty
years. See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance is No Bliss, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 525, Sept. 22,
2004, at 6 tbl. 1 (link). This paper also gives many similar examples of widespread ignorance about major policy issues.
53
Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property: Kelo and the Perfect Storm, in
PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 23 tbl.4 (Nathan Persily et al. eds., forthcoming
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962170 (link).
54
See Somin, supra note 29, at 94–95.
48
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By the same token, it is possible that many of the low income survey
respondents who support a ban on economic development takings also do
so out of ignorance, perhaps not realizing that it won‘t protect them against
blight condemnations. This is less likely, however, since large numbers of
poor people have personal experience with blight takings, either because
they themselves have been displaced by them or because they may know
other people who have.55 By contrast, very few middle class or wealthy
voters are likely to have had comparable experiences.
Finally, it is worth noting that even a knowledgeable and sophisticated
voter might have rational reasons for supporting a ban on economic development takings, while letting government retain the power to condemn at
least some ―blighted‖ areas, narrowly defined. As I have argued in great
detail in a forthcoming article, market mechanisms can, in most cases, accomplish the goals of economic development takings without the need for
eminent domain;56 by contrast, private sector elimination of blight may
sometimes be stymied by collective action problems requiring government
intervention to overcome.57 My own view is that a ban on blight condemnations is probably desirable, even in spite of such concerns. Other specialists
surely disagree, however.
In the absence of survey data directly addressing the issue, it is impossible to definitively determine whether Professor Dana‘s claim that voters
are motivated by disdain for the interests of the poor is correct. I suspect
that a significant number of voters may indeed see the issue as he conjectures, but most do not. At this point, however, I emphasize only that his is
only one of several possible explanations for the laws he describes and that
there are competing explanations supported by at least some substantial
evidence.
Finally, it is important to note that even if Professor Dana is right about
voters‘ motivations, the motives for enacting a law are less important than
its effects. As explained in Part I, a ban on economic development takings
combined with a restrictive definition of blight can provide real benefits to
the poor even if middle class voters do not intend such a result.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-seven of the thirty-six state reform laws enacted since 2005 do
not reflect the combination of forbidding economic development condemnations, while permitting ―blight‖ condemnations only in poor areas that
Professor Dana decries. Most either ban both blight and economic development takings or define ―blight‖ so broadly that even middle class homes
could be condemned.
55
Since World War II, some 3.6 million mostly poor Americans have been displaced by ―urban renewal‖ condemnations alone. Id. at 94.
56
Id. at 21–28.
57
Id. at 95.
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To the extent that some post-Kelo reform laws do fit this pattern, it is
far from clear that this harms the poor more than the status quo. A ban on
economic development takings provides at least some valuable protection
for the poor, even if incomplete. At the same time, there is little evidence
that it inflicts any ―expressive harms‖ on them.
The available evidence suggests that most of the poor either do not
perceive a ban on economic development takings as an expressive harm
against themselves, or at least do not believe that this harm outweighs the
benefits of a ban. It is also far from clear that those middle class and wealthy voters who continue to support ―blight condemnations‖ do so because
of an invidious belief that the poor are less worthy of protection than they
themselves. Outside observers should therefore be cautious about inferring
the existence of expressive harms unless and until we have firm evidence
that they are real and that their magnitude is significant enough to outweigh
the benefits—including the benefits to the poor—of a ban on economic development takings. Like most other legislation, post-Kelo reform laws
should be judged by their effects, not by the intentions of their supporters.
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